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Abstract
In this paper, we generalize the Almgren-Chriss’s market impact model to a more
realistic and flexible framework and employ it to derive and analyze some aspects
of optimal liquidation problem in a security market. We illustrate how a trader’s
liquidation strategy alters when multiple venues and extra information are brought
into the security market and detected by the trader. This study gives some new
insights into the relationship between liquidation strategy and market liquidity, and
provides a multi-scale approach to the optimal liquidation problem with randomly
varying volatility.
Keywords: Dynamic Programming (DP); Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) Equation;
Limit Order (LO); Market Order (MO); Multi-scale Stochastic Volatility Model; Quadratic
Variation.
1 Introduction
The optimal liquidation problem of large trades has been studied extensively in the micro-
structure literature. Two major sources of risk faced by large traders are: (i) inventory
risk arising from uncertainty in asset value; and (ii) transaction costs arising from mar-
ket friction. In a frictionless and competitive market, an asset can be traded with any
amount at any rate without affecting the market price of the asset. The optimal liqui-
dation problem then becomes an optimal stopping problem. In an incomplete market,
the optimal liquidation problem involves delicate market-micro-structural issues. The
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impacts of transaction costs on optimal liquidation and optimal portfolio selection have
been studied via various mechanisms [1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 19].
In this paper, we adopt a simple, but practical market impact model to study some
aspects of the optimal liquidation problem. The model is phenomenological and not
directly based on the fine details of micro-structure though it may primarily be related
to some literature on market micro-structure. Following Almgren and Chriss [1], we
decompose the price impact into temporary price impact and permanent price impact.
Temporary impact refers to temporary imbalance in supply/demand caused by trading. It
disappears immediately when trading activities cease. Permanent impact means changes
in the “equilibrium” price due to trading, which lasts at least for the whole process of
liquidation.
We generalize the work of Almgren and Chriss [1] to a more realistic and flexible
framework in which multiple venues are available for the trader to submit his/her trades.
We mainly consider short-term liquidation problem for a large trader who experiences
temporary and permanent market impact. Two broad classes of problems are addressed
in this paper which we believe are representative. The first one is the case with constant
volatility. This assumption considerably simplifies the problem and allows us to exhibit
the essential features of liquidation across multiple venues without losing ourselves in
complexities. The second one is the case when volatility varies randomly throughout
the trading horizon. In this case, we present a “pure” stochastic volatility approach, in
which the volatility is modeled as an Itoˆ process driven by a Brownian motion that has
a component independent of the Brownian motion driving the asset price. In comparison
with Almgren’s work in [4], we mainly focus on a special class of volatility model, the
time-scale volatility model proposed in [9, 10]:
dνt = (m− νt)dt+ ξ
√
dWt,
and work in the regime  1. The separation of time-scales provides an efficient way to
identify and track the effect of stochastic volatility, which is desirable from the practical
perspective.
We also generalize our basic model to include the usage of limit orders. Different
from market orders, limit orders are designed to give investors more flexibility over the
buying and selling prices of their trades. The most unfavorable feature of limit orders
might be the execution risk, i.e., a successful execution is not guaranteed. Cartea and
Jaimungal [7] have constructed optimal strategies for this problem under temporary-
impact-only assumption. In their model, and also in ours, investors are allowed to trade
both via limit sell orders, whose execution are uncertain, and via market sell orders,
whose execution are immediate but costly. Limit orders in their model are allowed to be
continuously submitted. Market orders, however, are only for one unit, and are executed
at a sequence of increasing stopping times. This model works well for small- and mid-
size orders. However, when it comes to large orders, execution cannot be guaranteed.
Furthermore, the optimal stopping time setting makes the problem difficult to be solved.
To ensure execution and track the trace of liquidating strategy, we model the market
orders strategy as a continuous control problem. When other market participants’ buy
market orders arrive, limit sell orders will be used instead to take advantage of the price
gap.
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As mentioned in Rudloff et al. [18], a major reason for developing dynamic models in-
stead of static ones is the fact that one can incorporate the flexibility of dynamic decisions
to improve our objective function. Time-inconsistent criteria are generally not favorable to
introduce in the study, since the associated policies are sub-optimal. The mean-variance
criterion is popular for taking both return and risk into account. However, the mean-
variance criterion may induce a potential problem of time-inconsistency, i.e., planned and
implemented policies are different, and make the problem complicated. Hence, to take
both return and risk into account, instead of adopting the mean-variance criterion, we
are most interested in the mean-quadratic optimal agency liquidation strategies, as they
are proved to be time-consistent in [11, 12].
In the following, we outline the major contributions of this paper. First, we ob-
tain closed-form solutions for optimal liquidation strategy under the constant volatility
approach for any level of risk aversion. This leads to an efficient frontier of optimal
strategies. Each point on this frontier represents a strategy with the minimal level of cost
for its level of risk-aversion. In addition, we also show that in the presence of multiple
venues, institutional traders might hide their liquidating purposes and reduce the perma-
nent market impacts through splitting their orders across multiple venues. When more
trading venues spring up in financial market, the liquidity of the market enhances. This
provides good suppliers of liquidity to the traders, and that the trader with more choices
of venues to submit his/her trades may be willing to close his/her position as soon as pos-
sible. Second, we present a framework for the liquidation problem that is general enough
to include the effect of stochastic volatility. Moreover, it is tractable and the parame-
ters can be estimated efficiently on large datasets that are increasing available. Third,
we study the effect of incorporating limit orders so as to detect market information. In
general, for a pure liquidation problem, people do not include the usage of limit orders.
But in our study of including limit orders, we find that, realizing the information carried
by other market participants, traders will slow down their liquidating speed so as to get
profit from market momentum.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 devotes to model build-
ing for the execution problem in the presence of multiple trading venues. The Profit & Loss
(P&L) of trading and a mean-quadratic-variation criterion are proposed and discussed in
this section. The solutions and numerical results for the constant volatility approximation
are presented in Section 3. Extension of the results to the stochastic volatility approxi-
mation are then discussed in Section 4. An extension of our model to the incorporation
of limit orders is studied in Section 5. The final section summarizes the results.
2 Problem Setup
In this section, we first present our liquidation problem in the presence of multiple trading
venues based on the principle of no arbitrage. We then discuss the optimal liquidating
strategies.
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2.1 The Trader’s Liquidation Problem
We consider an institutional trader. Beginning at time t = 0, he/she has a liquidation
target of Q shares, which must be completed by time t = T . The number of shares
remaining to liquidate at time t is the trajectory Xt, with X0 = Q and XT = 0. Suppose
there are N distinct venues for the trader to submit his/her trades. The rate of liquidating
in Venue n (n = 1, 2, . . . , N) is θ
(n)
t . Thus,
θ
(1)
t + · · ·+ θ(N)t = −
dXt
dt
.
For a liquidation program, Q > 0, we expect Xt ≥ 0 is decreasing and θ(n)t ≥ 0 (a buy
program may be modeled similarly). Here, θ
(n)
t (n = 1, 2, . . . , N), are the choice variables
or decision variables of the trader at time t based on the observed information available
at time t. In general, the trajectory Xt depends on the price movements and market
conditions that are discovered during trading, so it is a stochastic process.
Consider a probability space (Ω,F ,P) endowed with a filtration {Ft}t≥0 representing
the information structure available to the trader. Based on this probability space, we
introduce the notion of admissible control.
Definition 1 A stochastic process θ(·) = {(θ(1)t , . . . , θ(N)t ), 0 ≤ t ≤ T} is called an admis-
sible control process if the following conditions hold:
(i) (Adaptivity) For each time t ∈ [0, T ], θt = (θ(1)t , · · · , θ(N)t ) is Ft-adapted;
(ii) (Non-negativity) θt ∈ RN+ , where RN+ is the set of nonnegative real-valued N-
dimensional vectors;
(iii) (Consistency) ∫ T
0
N∑
n=1
θ
(n)
t dt ≤ Q;
(iv) (Square-integrability)
E
[∫ T
0
[|θ(1)t |2 + · · ·+ |θ(N)t |2]dt
]
<∞;
(v) (L∞-integrability)
E
[
max
0≤t≤T
[|θ(1)t |+ · · ·+ |θ(N)t |]
]
<∞.
For convenience, we let Θt denote the collection of admissible controls with respect to time
t(< T ), and let Θ̂t denote the collection of controls only satisfying the conditions (i), (iv)
and (v).
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Suppose the stock price evolves over time according to1
dSt = σtdWt (1)
where {Wt}t≥0 is a standard Brownian motion with filtration {Ft}t≥0, and σt > 0 is the
absolute volatility of the stock price, which can be (i) constant; (ii) time-dependent; (iii)
volatility depending on the current stock price St and time t; and (iv) volatility driven by
an additional random process.
In Eq. (1), the drift term is set to be zero, which means that we expect no obvious
trend in its future movement. The total time T is usually one day or less, the drift is
generally not significant over such a short trading horizon.
2.2 The Market Impact Model
Generally, risky assets, especially for those with low liquidity, exhibit price impacts due
to the feedback effects of trader’s liquidating strategies. Price impact refers to how the
price moves in response to an order in the market. Small orders usually have insignificant
impact, especially for liquid stocks. Large orders, however, may have a significant impact
on the price. Investors, especially institutional investors, must keep the price impact in
mind when making investment decisions.
As discussed in Almgren [2, 4], the price received on each trade is affected by the
rates of buying and selling, both permanently and temporarily. The temporal impact is
related to the liquidity cost faced by the investor while the permanent impact is linked to
information transmitted to the market by the investor’s trades. Almgren [4] proposed a
linear market impact model to describe the dynamics of the asset price (a single venue is
considered):
dSIt = dSt − ηperθtdt. (2)
In this model, ηper > 0 is the coefficient of permanent impact and is an absolute coefficient
rather than fractional. In this section, in view of Almgren’s linear price impact model,
we consider the case of multiple venues based on equilibrium and no-arbitrage.
Different from the single-venue case in Eq. (2), each venue’s price in the multiple-venue
case depends not only on its internal transactions but also on its competitor’s deals. When
one trader submits his orders to a venue, he will lead to a direct price impact in this venue.
Other traders, being aware of this impact, will adjust their order scheduling to benefit
from favorable prices across the different venues and thus affect prices. Suppose that there
are N venues, where the same financial instrument can be traded simultaneously, namely
Venue 1, Venue 2, . . ., Venue N . The following proposition provides a price impact model
based on Almgren’s linear price impact model.
Proposition 1 Assume that market liquidity remains unchanged over [0, T ], and that
there exists no arbitrage opportunity in the financial market. Based on the linear market
1When long-term strategies are considered, it is more reasonable to consider geometric rather than
arithmetic Brownian motion. In this paper, we mainly focus on short-term liquidating strategies, the
total fractional price changes over such a short time are relatively small, and hence the difference between
arithmetic and geometric Brownian motions can be negligible.
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impact model in Almgren [4], the affected asset price in the presence of N trading venues
is given by
dSIt = dSt − ηper(β(1) · θ(1)t + · · ·+ β(N) · θ(N)t )dt
where ηper > 0 is the coefficient of permanent impact, (θ
(1)
t , · · · , θ(N)t ) is the trader’s
liquidating speed, and
N∑
n=1
β(n) = 1, β(n) ∈ (0, 1)
with β(n) describing Venue n’s market efficiency.
Proof: Without loss of generality, we prove that Proposition 1 holds for N = 2. Suppose
that our investor’s trading scheduling over a small interval [t, t+∆t) is (θ
(1)
t , θ
(2)
t ) and that
θ
(1)
t < θ
(2)
t : liquidating θ
(1)
t ∆t shares in Book 1, and θ
(2)
t ∆t shares in Book 2. Here θ
(1)
t and
θ
(2)
t are interpreted as liquidation rates in Venue 1 and Venue 2, respectively. Assume that
trades occur immediately after time t. With the assumption of linear price impact, stock
prices in the two trading venues, immediately after the execution of the orders, are drawn
down to p
(1)
t = S
I
t −ηperθ(1)t ∆t and p(2)t = SIt −ηperθ(2)t ∆t, respectively. Obviously, we have
p
(1)
t > p
(2)
t . Other investors, being aware of this arbitrage opportunity, will adjust their
trading schedules, buying from Venue 2 and selling to Venue 1, to benefit from favorable
prices across the two venues. Suppose the financial market processes linear convergence,
and the convergence speed is very quickly and proportional to market’s efficiency. The
adjusted stock prices at time t+ ∆t are then given by
p
(1)
t+∆t = S
I
t +
∫ t+∆t
t
σudWu − ηperθ(1)t ∆t− x(ηperθ(2)t − ηperθ(1)t )∆t
and
p
(2)
t+∆t = S
I
t +
∫ t+∆t
t
σudWu − ηperθ(2)t ∆t+ y(ηperθ(2)t − ηperθ(1)t )∆t,
respectively. Under the no-arbitrage principle, p
(1)
t+∆t = p
(2)
t+∆t which yields x+ y = 1, and
SIt+∆t = p
(1)
t+∆t = p
(2)
t+∆t = S
I
t +
∫ t+∆t
t
σudWu − ηper(yθ(1)t + xθ(2)t )∆t.
Letting x = β and ∆t→ 0, we obtain
dSIt = dSt − ηper[(1− β)θ(1)t + βθ(2)t ]dt.
Different from the affected stock price (permanent price impact), the actual price
received on each trade (temporary price impact) varies with place and time
S˜
I,(n)
t = S
I
t − ηtem,(n)θ(n)t . (3)
Here S˜
I,(n)
t is the price actually received in Venue n (n = 1, 2, . . . , N), and η
tem,(n) is the
coefficient of temporary market impact in that venue. A number of market impact models
have been considered in the literature [13], but this simple one is good enough for our
concerned problems and discussions.
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2.3 Estimation of Model Parameters
Regarding the parameter estimation of σt in Eq. (1) and (η
per, ηtem,(n)) in Eq. (2) and
Eq. (3), Almgren [4] proposed a variety of methods using high-frequency market data:
(i) For volatility σt, to filter out noise associated with market details and obtain reliable
estimates, one could estimate σt by using market data from the preceding 5 minutes,
which typically would contain hundreds of trades and potentially thousands of quote
updates;
(ii) One proxy for price impact parameter ηper would be the realized trade volume over
the last few minutes: if more people are trading actively in the market, one would
be able to liquidate a certain quantity with lower slippage;
(iii) For price impact parameters ηtem,(n), one proxy would be the trade volume resting
at or near the bid price if one is a seller (at or near the ask price if one is a buyer):
a large volume there might indicate the presence of a motivated buyer and a good
opportunity for one to go in as a seller with low impact.
2.4 The Gain/Loss of Trading
Let Ct denote the cash flow accumulated by time t. Assume that investors withhold the
liquidation proceeds, or simply assume that the risk-free interest rate r = 0, we have
Ct =
∫ t
0
(S˜I,(1)s θ
(1)
s + · · ·+ S˜I,(N)s θ(N)s )ds, t < T.
Given the state variables (SIt , Ct, Xt) the instant before the end of trading t = T−, we
have one final liquidation (if necessary) so that the number of shares owned at t = T is
XT = 0. The liquidation value CT after this final trade is defined to be
CT = CT− +XT−(SIT− − Co(XT−)),
where Co(q), a non-negative increasing function in q, represents the market impact costs
the trader incurs when liquidating the outstanding position XT−. The gain/loss (G/L) of
trading, relative to the arrival price benchmark, is the difference between the total dollar
gained/lost by liquidating Q shares and the initial market value: RT = CT −QS0. After
integrating by parts and using
Xt = Q−
∫ t
0
(θ(1)s + · · ·+ θ(N)s )ds,
we have
RT = CT −QS0
=
∫ T−
0
σtXtdWt −XT−Co(XT−)− ηper
∫ T−
0
Xt(β
(1)θ
(1)
t + · · ·+ β(N)θ(N)t )dt
−
∫ T−
0
[
ηtem,(1)(θ
(1)
t )
2 + · · ·+ ηtem,(N)(θ(N)t )2
]
dt.
(4)
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Generally speaking, investors are risk averse and demand a higher return for a more
risky investment. The mean-variance criterion is useful when taking both return and risk
into account. However, the mean-variance criterion may induce a potential problem of
time-inconsistency, i.e., planned and implemented policies are different, and hence com-
plicate the problem. To avoid the time-inconsistent problem incurred by mean-variance
criterion, instead of using the variance/standard deviation as the risk measure, one can
adopt the quadratic variation, ∫ T−
0
σ2uX
2
udu.
It accumulates the future value of the instantaneous risk, i.e., (XudSu)
2, due to holding
Xu units of the risky asset S. When properly normalized, the quadratic variation can also
be interpreted as the average standard deviation per unit time, see, for instance, Brugiere
[5].
Let (St, σt, Xt) = (s, σ, q) be the initial state. At any time t ∈ [0, T ), the optimal
policy should solve the following optimization problem:
J(t, s, σ, q) = max
(θ
(1)
u ,··· ,θ(N)u )t≤u≤T∈Θt
{
Et[RT −Rt]− λ · Et
[∫ T−
t
σ2uX
2
udu
]}
, (5)
where Et[·] denotes the conditional expectation with respect to the filtration Ft. The
following proposition discusses the time consistency of the optimal strategies and its proof
is given in Appendix A.
Proposition 2 (Time consistency of the optimal strategies). Let (t1, s1, σ1, q1)
be some state at time t1 and θ
∗
t1,s1,σ1,q1
(·) = (θ(1)t1,s1,σ1,q1(·), . . . , θ(N)t1,s1,σ1,q1(·))T be the cor-
responding optimal strategy. Let (t2, s2, σ2, q2) be some other state at time t2 > t1 and
θ∗t2,s2,σ2,q2(·) =
(
θ
(1)
t2,s2,σ2,q2(·), . . . , θ(N)t2,s2,σ2,q2(·)
)T
be the corresponding optimal strategy. It
follows that the optimal controls of Problem (5) are time-consistent in the sense that for
the same state (t′, s′, σ′, q′) at a later time t′ > t2,
θ∗t1,s1,σ1,q1(t
′, s′, σ′, q′) = θ∗t2,s2,σ2,t2(t
′, s′, σ′, q′). (6)
2.5 Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) Equation
Since the optimal controls satisfy the Bellman’s principle of optimality as shown in Ap-
pendix A, dynamic programming (DP) approach can be directly applied to this problem.
The optimal control θ∗ can be obtained by solving the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
(HJB) equation derived in Appendix A as follows:
(HJB-1)

(∂t + L)J − λσ2t q2
− min
θt∈Θt
{
ηper(β(1)θ
(1)
t + · · ·+ β(N)θ(N)t )q + ηtem,(1)(θ(1)t )2 + · · ·+ ηtem,(N)(θ(N)t )2
+(θ
(1)
t + · · ·+ θ(N)t ) ∂qJ
}
= 0
J(T−, s, σ, q) = −qCo(q),
where L is the generator of the processes (St, σt)t≥0.
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Notice that the optimization problem included in HJB-1 is a constrained optimiza-
tion problem with constraints: (1) θt ∈ RN+ and (2)
∫ T
0
N∑
n=1
θ
(n)
t dt ≤ Q. To solve this
constrained optimization problem, we first consider relaxing the constraints, namely, re-
placing Θt by Θ̂t, and solving the following unconstrained optimization problem:
(HJB-1′)

(∂t + L)J − λσ2t q2
− min
θt∈Θ̂t
{
ηper(β(1)θ
(1)
t + · · ·+ β(N)θ(N)t )q + ηtem,(1)(θ(1)t )2 + · · ·+ ηtem,(N)(θ(N)t )2
+(θ
(1)
t + · · ·+ θ(N)t ) ∂qJ
}
= 0
J(T−, s, σ, q) = −qCo(q),
and then prove that under some assumptions, the two optimization problems, included in
HJB-1 and HJB-1′, respectively, are equivalent. From the HJB-1′ equation, the optimal
control without any constraint is
θn,∗t = −
1
2ηtem,(n)
(∂qJ + η
perβ(n)q), for n = 1, · · · , N. (7)
The corresponding value function J then solves the following partial differential equation
(PDE):  (∂t + L)J − λσ
2
t q
2 +
N∑
n=1
1
4ηtem,(n)
(∂qJ + η
perβ(n)q)2 = 0
J(T−, s, σ, q) = −qCo(q).
(8)
In the following sections, we exhibit solutions to Eq. (8) with linear penalty: Co(q) =
Kq to two special cases: (i) constant volatility and (ii) slow mean-reverting stochastic
volatility. In each case, we work on the ansatz that
J(t, s, σ, q) = f(t, s, σ) + g(t, s, σ)q + h(t, s, σ)q2.
The first case has explicit liquidating formula. For the slow mean-reverting stochastic
volatility approximation discussed in this paper, there is a multi-scale argument that
reduces the optimal liquidation PDE to a formal series expansion that can easily be
solved explicitly. We present the argument and the accuracy of this approach in Section
3.3.
3 Constant Volatility
The most illuminating case is that σt is constant, i.e., σt ≡ σ. This considerably simplifies
the problem and allows us to exhibit the essential features of liquidating across multiple
venues without losing ourselves in complexities. The problem becomes essentially the
well-known stochastic linear regulator with time dependence.
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With the constant volatility assumption, J(t, s, σ, q) = J(t, q;σ) independent of s,
since the terminal data does not depend on s and HJB-1′ introduces no s-dependence.
We look for a solution quadratic in the inventory variable q:
J(t, q;σ) = f(t;σ) + g(t;σ)q + h(t;σ)q2. (9)
With this assumption, the optimal control can be rewritten in the form of
θn,∗t = −
1
2ηtem,(n)
[(2h(t;σ) + ηperβ(n))q + g(t;σ)]. (10)
To solve Eq. (8), f, g and h must satisfy the following ordinary differential equations
(ODEs):  h˙ = λσ
2 −
N∑
n=1
1
4ηtem,(n)
(2h+ ηperβ(n))2
h(T−;σ) = −K g˙ = −
(
N∑
n=1
1
2ηtem,(n)
(2h+ ηperβ(n))
)
g
g(T−;σ) = 0 f˙ = −
(
N∑
n=1
1
4ηtem,(n)
)
g2
f(T−;σ) = 0.
(11)
It is straightforward to show that g(t;σ) ≡ 0 and f(t;σ) ≡ 0. If we set
an =
1
ηtem,(n)
, bn =
ηperβn
ηtem,(n)
, cn =
(ηperβn)2
4ηtem,(n)
,
and
a =
N∑
n=1
an, b =
N∑
n=1
bn, c =
N∑
n=1
cn,
then the unknown function h(t;σ) solves the following first-order ODE:
h˙ = λσ2 +
b2 − 4ac
4a︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆N
−a
(
h+
b
2a
)2
h(T−;σ) = −K.
(12)
Eq. (12) is a first-order ODE with constant coefficients, and we can find the exact solution
via direct integrations:
h(t;σ) =

√
∆N
a
· ςe
−2√a∆N (T−t) − 1
ςe−2
√
a∆N (T−t) + 1
− b
2a
, ∆N ≥ 0
√
−∆N
a
tan
(
arctan
( b− 2aK
2
√−a∆N
)
+
√
−a∆N(T − t)
)
− b
2a
, ∆N < 0,
(13)
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where the constant ς is given by
ς =
(
1− 2Ka− b
2
√
a∆N
)(
1 +
2Ka− b
2
√
a∆N
)−1
.
It is worth noting that
θn,∗t = −
1
2ηtem,(n)
(2h(t;σ) + ηperβ(n))Xt.
and  X˙t = −
N∑
n=1
θn,∗t
X0 = Q.
Hence, we have
Xt = Q · exp
(∫ t
0
N∑
n=1
1
2ηtem,(n)
(2h(u;σ) + ηperβ(n))du
)
.
For n = 1, 2, . . . , N , we have b2n = 4ancn. According to Ho¨lder’s inequality, we have
b2 − 4ac ≤ 0, and the equality holds if and only if (1) N = 1; or (2) the trading venues
have the same market efficiency, namely, β(1) = · · · = β(N) = 1/N . We then have the
following proposition and its proof is given in Appendix B.
Proposition 3 Assume that the model parameters satisfy the condition2:
K >
b
2a
+
√
|∆N |
a
. (14)
If N = 1 or the trading venues have the same market efficiency, then h(t;σ) is a decreasing
function in t and 2h(t;σ) + ηperβ(n) ≤ 0 for n = 1, · · · , N , which implies that
(1) θn,∗t ≥ 0, for any n = 1, · · · , N ; and that
(2)
∫ T
0
N∑
n=1
θn,∗t dt ≤ Q.
Then the control policy in Eq. (10) is optimal.
Since
∂h(t;σ)
∂t
= −∂h(t;σ)
∂τ
< 0,
where τ = T−t is the remaining time to close of trading. J(t, q;σ) = h(t;σ)q2 is a strictly
decreasing function in t and a strictly increasing function in T .
2That is, clearing fees associated with the outstanding position XT− dominate the potential profit
arising from arbitrage opportunities incurred by the permanent price impact and the potential position
risk involved by price fluctuations.
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Generally speaking, one’s ability to bear risk is measured mainly in terms of objective
factors, such as time horizon, risk aversion and expected income. Let JT (t, q;σ) denote
the value function of the optimization problem (5) with time horizon T , for any T1 >
T2 > t, we have JT1(t, q;σ) > JT2(t, q;σ). This coincides with the actual situation that
an investor’s risk affordability directly relates to his/her time horizon. An investor with
a two-week time horizon can be considered to have a greater ability to bear risk, other
things being equal, than an investor with a two-hour horizon. This difference is because
over two weeks there is more scope for losses to be recovered or other adjustments to
circumstances to be made than there is over two hours.
3.1 Effect of Multiple Venues
With the development of electronic exchanges, many new trading destinations have ap-
peared to compete the trading capability of the fundamental financial markets such as
the NASDAQ’s Inet and NYSE in the US, or EURONEXT, the London Stock Exchange
and Xetra in Europe. As a result, the same financial instrument can be traded simulta-
neously in different venues. These trading venues are generally different from each other
at any time because of variation in the fees or rebates they demand to trade and the
liquidity they offer. Therefore, to liquidate a large order, traders may need to split their
order across various venues to reduce market impact. In this subsection, we illustrate
theoretically how multiple venues affect an investor’s trading strategy.
Denote the liquidating strategy corresponding to a single venue case as θsingle,∗t . Sup-
pose that there are N distinct venues for an investor to submit his/her trades and that
condition (14) is satisfied. Without loss of generality, we assume that there is no difference
among there trading venues, namely β1 = · · · = βN = 1/N and ηtem,(1) = · · · = ηtem,(N) =
ηtem. The following two conclusions about the effects on optimal liquidating speed and
transaction cost can be drawn.
(i) (Effect on optimal liquidating speed). First, we observe that θ1,∗t = · · · = θN,∗t :=
θ∗t (N), where
θ∗t (N) = −
√
λσ2
ηtemN
× ς(N)e
−2
√
λσ2N/ηtem(T−t) − 1
ς(N)e−2
√
λσ2N/ηtem(T−t) + 1
Xt := J(t, N)Xt,
with
ς(N) =
2
√
λσ2N
ηtem
− (2K N
ηtem
− b)
2
√
λσ2N
ηtem
+ (2K N
ηtem
− b)
.
Notice that X0 = Q and that
lim
N→∞
X˙0 = − lim
N→∞
Nθ∗0(N) = − lim
N→∞
NJ(0, N)Q =∞.
For any fixed time t ∈ (0, T ), we have
lim
N→∞
J(t, N) = 0 and lim
N→∞
√
NJ(t, N) =
√
λσ2
ηtem
.
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Hence
lim
N→∞
Xt = lim
N→∞
Qe−
∫ t
0 NJ(u,N)du = lim
N→∞
Qe−
√
N×∫ t0 √NJ(u,N)du = lim
N→∞
Qe−a1
√
N = 0,
where3
0 < a1 = lim
N→∞
∫ t
0
√
NJ(u,N)du =
√
λσ2
ηtem
t <∞. (15)
We also have
lim
N→∞
−X˙t = lim
N→∞
Nθ∗t (N)
= lim
N→∞
QNJ(t, N)× e−
∫ t
0 NJ(u,N)du
= lim
N→∞
Q
√
N ×√NJ(t, N)
e
√
N×∫ t0 √NJ(u,N)du
= lim
N→∞
Q
√
λσ2
ηtem
×
√
N
ea1
√
N
= lim
N→∞
Q
√
λσ2
ηtem
× 1
a1ea1
√
N
= 0.
That is to say, as N approaches infinity, the investor would immediately close his/her
position at the beginning of the trading horizon.
(ii) (Effect on transaction cost). The two strategies: 1) {θsingle,∗t }t∈[0,T ], liquidating
in a single venue; and 2){
θ
(1)
t = θ
(2)
t = · · · = θ(n)t =
1
N
θsingle,∗t
}
t∈[0,T ]
,
equally splitting the original target among N venues, transmit the same informa-
tion to the market (i.e., have the same permanent impact), but involve different
transaction costs (i.e., have different temporary price impacts)∫ T−
0
N∑
n=1
(
SIt − S˜I,(n)t
)
θ
(n)
t dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
costs in N -venue
=
∫ T−
0
(
N∑
n=1
ηtem
N2
)
(θsingle,∗t )
2dt
=
∫ T−
0
ηtem(θsingle,∗t )
2
N
dt
≤
∫ T−
0
ηtem(θsingle,∗t )
2dt =
∫ T−
0
(
SIt − S˜It
)
θsingle,∗t dt.︸ ︷︷ ︸
costs in a single venue
3According to the structure of J(t,N), there exists a finite number M > 0 such that
|
√
NJ(t,N)| ≤M, for all (t,N) ∈ [0, T )× Z+,
where Z+ is the set of all nonnegative integers. Directly applying the Dominated convergence theorem
to {√NJ(t,N)}, we obtain the result in Eq. (15).
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That is, liquidating schedule across multiple venues can indeed help to reduce trans-
action costs arising from market liquidity.
3.2 Numerical Results
In this section, we provide some numerical results to illustrate the effects of different
market factors on investor’s liquidation strategy. We assume that there are N distinct
trading venues for an investor to submit his/her trades, and that there is no difference
among these venues. As far as our simulation is concerned, we choose the following
hypothetical values for the model parameters:
σ = exp(1), T = 1, K = 0.1, ηper = 0.005, ηtem = 0.01.
The risk-aversion parameter λ ranges across all nonnegative values, as the actual choice
of trajectory will be determined by the trader’s risk preference.
3.2.1 Effect of Multiple Venues
When multiple trading venues are available, dividing a target quantity across these venues
may help an investor to hide his liquidation purpose and hence reduce the permanent mar-
ket impact. To facilitate our analysis, we assume that these trading venues are identical
for the investor. Some numerical results are presented in Table 1.
Table 1: 1, 000 Simulations with Q = 100, s = 15, λ = 0.1.
Std Std
#{Venues} G/L (G/L)∗ qT (qT )∗∗ Value function
1 -461.80 63.38 1.43 2.22 -902.90
2 -324.86 54.19 0.03 0.04 -638.30
3 -265.08 46.12 0 0 -522.83
4 -230.51 43.03 0 0 -455.06
10 -147.22 33.51 0 0 -293.05
...
50 -72.92 18.57 0 0 -144.59
*: in 10−2
**: in 10−16
Table 1 provides a comparison of optimal liquidation strategy among investors facing
multiple venues. The first column shows the number of venues available for an investor
to submit his/her trades. The second and third columns show, respectively, the mean
and standard derivation of G/L (Eq. (16)). The negative G/L implies that the investor
is trading at a loss. The absolute value represents the cost of trading. As defined so far,
the cost of trading, relative to the arrival price benchmark, is the difference between the
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total dollars received to liquidate Q shares and the initial market value:
G/L =
∫ T
0
(S˜
I,(1)
t θ
(1)
t + · · ·+ S˜I,(N)t θ(N)t )dt+XT−(SIT− − Co(XT−))−QS0 (< 0). (16)
It is an indicator of market liquidity. The greater the loss, the worse the situation. The
last column shows the corresponding value taken by the value function:
G/L− λE
[∫ T
0
σstX
2
t dt
]
(< 0),
an indicator of the investor’s satisfaction. Investors are risk-averse (λ > 0), so usually
they do not hold outstanding stock uncleared at the end of trading t = T−. The fourth
and fifth columns show, respectively, the mean and standard deviation of the outstanding
position at the end of trading. The effect of multiple venues on investors’ liquidation
strategies is fairly straightforward. With the increase of trading venue, investors’ loss of
trading decreases. Meanwhile, as the number of trading venue increases, the risks involved
decreases, which in turn enhances investors’ satisfaction (measured by the value function).
3.2.2 Trading Curve
The average number of shares at each point of time, say the trading curves, with respect
to different number of multiple venues are depicted in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Trading curves with Q = 100.
15
It is clear that as the number of alternative choices increases, the average liquidation
speed increases. Indeed, a trader needs to trade fast to reduce position risk, when the
quantity to liquidate is large within the remaining time. However, an immediate execution
is often not possible or at a very high cost due to insufficient liquidity. The trading cost
reflects the difference between the amount at which the trader expects to sell and the
sales proceeds the trader actually receives. It is an indicator of the illiquidity of a market.
We can see from the results that, when more trading venues spring up in the financial
market, the liquidity of the asset enhances. This provides good supplies of liquidity to the
trader, and that the trader with more choices of venues to submit his/her trades may be
willing to close his/her position earlier. These observations are consistent with financial
intuition.
3.2.3 Efficient Frontier
The efficient frontier consists of all optimal trading strategies. Here the “optimal” refers
to the situation where no strategy has a smaller variance for the same or higher level
of expected transaction profits. For each level of risk-aversion, λ, there is an optimal
liquidating strategy. By running 1,000 simulations with initial inventory Q = 100, we
obtain an efficient frontier (see Figure 2).
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Figure 2: The efficient frontier.
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Each point on the frontier represents a distinct strategy for an investor with certain
level of risk-aversion. It shows the tradeoff between the expected revenues and the stan-
dard deviation. As we can see from this figure, the frontier increases along an approximate
smooth concave curve. The slope of the “tangent line” indicates the trader’s risk aversion
level λ.
The point on the most right is obtained for a risk-neutral trader with λ = 0. We define
this point as (Std0, R0). For any other point on the left, we have
Rt −R0 ≈ 1
2
(Stdt − Std0)2 d
2R
dStd2
∣∣∣
Std=Std0
.
A crucial insight is that for a risk neutral trader, a first-order decrease in the expected
revenue can approximately incur a second-order decrease in the standard deviation. The
efficient frontier depicted in Figure 2 is consistent with the one for the mean-variance
portfolio selection.
3.2.4 Effect of Illiquidity
The cost of trading has three main components, brokerage commission, bid-ask spread
(we will discuss this factor later) and price impact, of which liquidity affects the latter
two. Brokerage commission is usually negotiable and does not constitute a large fraction
of the total cost of trading except in small-size trades, which is a topic beyond the scope of
this paper. Stocks with low liquidity can have wide bid-ask spreads. The bid-ask spread,
which is the difference between the buying price and the selling price, is incurred as a cost
of trading a security. The larger the bid-ask spread, the higher is the cost of trading.
Liquidity also has implications for the price impact of trade. The extent of the price
impact depends on the liquidity of the stock. A stock that trades millions of shares a day
may be less affected than a stock that trades only a few hundred thousand shares a day.
The effect of temporary market impact ηtem, a key indicator of the illiquidity of a market,
is shown in Figure 3.
It is clear that traders in a market with larger temporary impact will involve higher
transaction costs; and that the cost distribution behaves like a normal distribution under
the assumption of constant volatility. We refer interested readers to the analysis of the
effects of market impact, both permanently and temporarily, to the work by Almgren [3].
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Figure 3: (Left-hand Side): ηtem = 0.005; (Right-hand Side): ηtem = 0.01.
4 Stochastic Volatility Model
The constant volatility assumption might be reasonable for large-cap US stocks. However,
this assumption becomes defective when we move to the analysis of small and medium-
capitalization stocks, whose volatilities vary randomly through the day. In this section,
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we relax the constant volatility assumption. Thus the value function J = J(t, s, σ, q) is a
function satisfies HJB-1. Similarly, we consider relaxing the constraints associated with
HJB-1 and solve the unconstrained optimization problem in HJB-1′. We then verify that
the obtained optimal control does satisfy all the constraints in HJB-1.
We present a framework that is general enough to take into account the effect of
stochastic volatility in the following.
4.1 Slow Mean-reverting Volatility Model
We analyze models in which stock prices are conditionally normal4, and the volatility
process is a positive and increasing function of a mean-reverting Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU)
process. That is, 
dSt = φ(νt)dWt
dνt = (m− νt)dt+ ξ
√
 dBt
Bt = ρWt +
√
1− ρ2Zt
(17)
where {Wt} and {Zt} are two independent one-dimensional Brownian motions, and ρ is
the correlation between price and volatility shocks, with |ρ| < 1. The parameter m is the
equilibrium or long-term mean, (> 0) is the intrinsic time-scale of the process, and ξ,
combining with the scalar
√
, represents the degree of volatility around the equilibrium
m caused by shocks. Here {νt} is a simple building-block for a large class of stochastic
volatility models described by choice of φ(·). According to Itoˆ’s lemma,
dφ(νt) = 
[
φ′(νt)(m− νt) + ξ2φ′′(νt)
]
dt+ ξφ′(νt)
√
dBt.
We call these models mean-reverting because the volatility is a monotonic function of {νt}
whose drift pulls it towards the mean value m. The volatility is correspondingly pulled
towards approximately φ(m).
Plenty of analysis on specific Itoˆ models by numerical and analytical methods can be
found in the literature [4, 9]. Our goal here is to identify and capture the relevant features
of liquidating strategies for small- and medium-capitalization stocks. Our framework in
Eq. (17) is adequate and efficient enough to capture this. Here we will work in the regime
  1 (slow mean-reverting). For simplicity, we consider the case of N = 1. The value
function J under this setting solves the following PDE: (∂t + L) J − λφ2(ν)q2 +
1
4ηtem
(∂qJ + η
perq)2 = 0
J(T−, s, ν, q) = −Kq2.
(18)
Furthermore, we have J(t, s, ν, q) = J(t, ν, q) independent of s, since the terminal data
does not depend on s and PDE (18) introduces no s-dependence. Hence, the operator L
takes the form of
L = 
(
(m− ν)∂ν + 1
2
ξ2∂νν
)
.
4As we have discussed before, it is reasonable when considering short-term liquidating problem.
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Similarly as before, we look for a solution quadratic in the inventory variable q
J(t, ν, q) = f(t, ν) + g(t, ν)q + h(t, ν)q2. (19)
The optimal liquidating schedule can then be calculated through the relation
θ∗(t, ν, q) = − 1
2ηtem
[(
2h(t, ν) + ηper
)
q + g(t, ν)
]
. (20)
To solve Eq. (19), f, g and h must satisfy the following PDEs: (∂t + L)h− λφ2(ν) +
1
4ηtem
(2h+ ηper)2 = 0
h(T−, ν) = −K (∂t + L)g +
1
2ηtem
(2h+ ηper)g = 0
g(T−, ν) = 0 (∂t + L)f +
1
4ηtem
g2 = 0
f(T−, ν) = 0.
(21)
It is straightforward to verify that (Feynman-Kac formula)
g(t, ν) ≡ 0 and f(t, ν) ≡ 0.
If we set
Yt =
1
2ηtem
∫ t
0
(2h(u, νu) + η
per)du and h(t, νt, Yt) = e
Yt(2h(t, νt) + η
per).
According to Itoˆ’s lemma,
dh(t, νt, Yt) = e
Yt
{[
2(∂t + L)h+ 1
2ηtem
(2h+ ηper)2
]
dt+ 2ξ
√
∂νh dBt
}
= eYt
{
2λφ2(νt)dt+ 2ξ
√
∂νh dBt
}
.
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to h(u, νu, Yu) between t and T−, with h satisfying PDE (21), we
get:
h(t, νt, Yt) = e
YT−(−2K + ηper)− 2λ
∫ T
t
eYuφ2(νu)du− 2
∫ T
t
ξ
√
∂νh(u, νu)dBu.
Hence,
h(t, ν, y) = E
[
eYT−(−2K + ηper)− 2λ
∫ T
t
eYuφ2(νu)du
∣∣∣νt = ν, Yt = y] . (22)
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If condition (14) is satisfied, then −2K + ηper < 0, and hence h(t, ν, y) ≤ 0 for any
(t, ν, y) ∈ [0, T )× R× R. Therefore, 2h(t, ν) + ηper ≤ 0 for any (t, ν) ∈ [0, T )× R. Then
the control policy in Eq. (20) is optimal.
Eq. (22) just provides an implicit analytical solution to h. However, for the general
coefficients (φ,m, , ξ), we do not have an explicit solution. The small- regime gives rise
to a regular perturbation expansion in the powers of . As in [9], we seek an asymptotic
approximation for h:
h(t, ν) = h(0)(t, ν) + h(1)(t, ν) + 2h(2)(t, ν) + · · ·+ . (23)
This is a series expansion, for which we find h(i) for i = 0, 1 explicitly, and study the
accuracy when using the truncated series in Section 4.3.2. In the next sections, we present
our asymptotic approach for h and the accuracy of our approximate optimal liquidation
policy.
4.2 Asymptotics
We first construct a regular perturbation expansion in the powers of  by writing
L = L0, h(t, ν) =
∑
i≥0
ih(i)(t, ν)
where
L0 = (m− ν)∂ν + 1
2
ξ2∂νν .
Substituting these expansions into Eq. (21) and grouping the terms of the powers of ,
we find that the lowest order equations of the regular perturbation expansion are
O(1) : 0 = ∂th(0) − λφ2(ν) + 1
4ηtem
(2h(0) + ηper)2
O() : 0 = ∂th(1) + L0h(0) + 1
ηtem
(2h(0) + ηper)h(1)
(24)
with terminal data
h(0)(T−, ν) = −K and h(1)(T−, ν) = 0.
The solutions of Eq. (24) can be obtained easily. Indeed, we have
h(0)(t, ν) =
√
ηtemλφ2(ν) · ς(ν)e
−2
√
λφ2(ν)/ηtem(T−t) − 1
ς(ν)e−2
√
λφ2(ν)/ηtem(T−t) + 1
− 1
2
ηper
h(1)(t, ν) =
∫ T
t
D(r; t)L0h(0)(r, ν)dr
(25)
where
ς(ν) =
√
ηtemλφ2(ν)− (K − ηper/2)√
ηtemλφ2(ν) + (K − ηper/2) and D(r; t) = exp
(
1
ηtem
∫ r
t
(2h(0) + ηper)dτ
)
.
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4.3 Optimal Strategy
We now analyze and interpret how the principle expansion terms for the value function
can be used in the expression for the optimal liquidation strategy θ∗, which leads to an
approximate feedback policy of the form:
θ∗(t, ν, q) = θ(0),∗(t, ν, q) +  θ(1),∗(t, ν, q) + · · ·+ .
4.3.1 Moving-Constant-Volatility Strategy
First, we introduce the zeroth order terms h(0) in the expansion for h. This gives the
zeroth order optimal liquidation strategy
θ(0),∗(t, ν, q) := − 1
2ηtem
(
2h(0)(t, ν) + ηper
)
q.
Recall that, in the case of constant volatility approach (Section 3.1),
θCons(t, q;σ) = − 1
2ηtem
(
2h(0)(t, νCons)) + ηper
)
q, (26)
where νCons = φ−1(σ) is a constant over [0, T ). This approximation might be reasonable
for most large-cap US stocks, for which, over short-term time frames like one day or
less, the volatility can be regard as a constant. However, this might not be a reasonable
approximation for assets that are less heavily traded than large-cap US stocks.
The naive constant-approach liquidation strategy for small- and medium-capitalization
stocks would adopt the strategy for large-cap US stocks, θCons, but with the coefficient σ
driven by a varying factor ν, i.e.,
θCons(t, q;φ(ν)) = θ(0),∗(t, ν, q). (27)
We call this strategy the moving constant-approach liquidation strategy. This strategy is a
successful one if the parameters remains constant when they are estimated from updated
segments of historical data. However, this is not always the case as the risk environment
is dynamic.
4.3.2 First-order Correlation to Optimal Policy
The approximation to the optimal strategy can be more accurate by going into the higher
order terms. Substituting the expansion of h up to terms in  gives
θ∗(t, ν, q) = θ˜∗(t, ν, q) + higher order terms
where
θ˜∗(t, ν, q) = − 1
2ηtem
(
2h(0)(t, ν) + ηper
)
q − 
ηtem
h(1)(t, ν)q, (28)
and h(0) and h(1) are given by Eq (25).
In Eq.(33), the term with  corresponds to traders’ response to the risk arising from
stochastic volatility, which can be regarded as the principle term hedging the risk factor.
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In the previous sections, we presented a “pure” stochastic volatility approach to the liqui-
dating problem, in which volatility σt is modeled as an Itoˆ process driven by a Brownian
motion that has a component independent of the Brownian motion driving the asset price.
In comparison with Almgren’s work in [4], we mainly focus on a special class of volatility
model, time-scale volatility model, and worked in the regime   1. The separation of
time-scales with respect to this kind of models provided an efficient way to identify and
track the effect of randomly varying volatility. The theorem below justifies the accuracy
of this approximation.
Theorem 1 For fixed t < T , ν and q, the optimal liquidating strategy θ∗(t, ν, q) defined
in Eq. (20), and our asymptotic approximation θ˜∗(t, ν, q) defined in Eq. (28) satisfy
|θ∗(t, ν, q)− θ˜∗(t, ν, q)| = O(2).
Proof: We note that, at any time t < T , according to Eqs. (20), (23) and (28)
|θ∗(t, ν, q)− θ˜∗(t, ν, q)| = |h− (h
(0) +  h(1))|
ηtem
q.
Defining the residual R = h− (h(0) +  h(1)). It solves the following PDE: (∂t + L)R +
1
ηtem
R[h+ h(0) + h(1) + ηper] + 2
{
L0h(1) + 1
ηtem
(h(1))2
}
= 0
R(T−, ν) = 0.
Directly applying the Feynman-Kac formula to this equation yields
R(t, ν) = 2 · Et
∫ T
t
D2(r; t){L0h(1) + 1
ηtem
(h(1))2}dr (29)
where
D2(r; t) = exp
(
1
ηtem
∫ r
t
[h+ h(0) + h(1) + ηper]dτ
)
.
One can see by direct computation that the integrand in Eq. (29) is bounded in [0, T ],
i.e., there exists a constant C, such that |R(t, ν)| ≤ C2 which completes our proof.
We remark that, given an initial value ν0 = ν,
νt
∣∣ν ∼ N(m+ (ν −m)e−t, ξ2
2
(1− e−2t)
)
,
where N (µ, σ2) is the Gaussian distribution with mean µ and standard variation σ.
Assume that
σt = φ(νt) or νt = φ
−1(σt)
is observable in real time with some reasonable degree of confidence. Indeed, we cannot
observe directly the volatility, what we may observe is the Volatility Index (VIX) which
may be used as a proxy for σt. There are different techniques to estimate the parameters
(,m, ξ). These estimators rely on the persistence of market properties (volatility and
liquidity), so that information about the past provides reasonable forecasts for the future.
Such persistence, at least across short horizons, is well documented (see, for instance,
Bouchaud et al. [6] for more details).
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4.4 Simulation Results
In this section, we assume φ(ν) = eν to test the performance of three different strategies
on small- and medium-capitalization stocks: (i) constant volatility approach in Eq. (26);
(ii) moving constant volatility approach in Eq. (27); and (iii) first-order correction in Eq.
(33). We refer to these strategies as “(i) Constant-Vol”, “ (ii) Moving-Constant-Vol” and
“(ii) Vol-adjust”, respectively.
As far as our simulation is concerned, we use the following hypothetical values of the
model parameters: ν = 0.5, m = 1,  = 0.01, ξ = 2, ρ = −0.45. The rest of the
parameters are assumed to be the same as those used in Section 3.2. The simulation
is obtained through the following procedure: at time t, the trader’s trading rate θt is
computed, given the state variables. At time t+dt, the mid-price is updated by a random
increment ±eν√dt. The volatility is updated accordingly by a random increment:
(m− ν)dt+ ξ√(ρ
√
dt±
√
1− ρ2
√
dt) or (m− ν)dt+ ξ√(−ρ
√
dt±
√
1− ρ2
√
dt).
Figure 4 illustrates the dynamics of the volatility for one simulation path. From the
simulation path depicted in Figure 4, we can see the leverage effect between the price and
the volatility.
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Figure 4: Dynamics of (St, exp(νt)) with ρ = −0.4.
5A negative value for ρ is used here to capture the leverage effect.
24
We then run 1, 000 simulations to compare the performance of these strategies, pri-
marily focusing on the shape of the profit and loss (P&L) profile. The table below shows
the final results.
Table 2: 1,000 simulations with λ = 0.1 w.r.t. RT .
Statistics Constant-Vol Moving-Constant-Vol Vol-adjust
Mean -300.70 -294.50 -288.46
Std 54.76 27.67 27.45
Skewness 1.03 0.23 0.24
Kurtosis 5.26 3.03 3.05
Objective function -577.58 -565.39 -560.36
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Figure 5: The performance of the “Constant-Vol” strategy on small- and medium-
capitalization assets with their volatilities varying randomly through the day.
As we can see from Table 2, the differences among these strategies are significant. Prof-
iting from hedging the risk arising from stochastic volatility is possible. Compared with
the “Constant-Vol” strategy, the results in the second column, other strategies adapting
to the varying volatility, either “Moving-Constant-Vol” (the results in the third column)
or “Vol-adjust” (the results in the fourth column), obtain a lower cost and a smaller risk.
The more accurate the adaption, the lower the cost of trading and the smaller the risk of
liquidating.
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The “Constant-Vol” strategy is a successful one if the underlying assets are large-
cap US stocks. However, it is not applicable for assets that are less heavily traded than
large-cap US stocks, where volatilities are believed to vary randomly through the day.
Figure 5 displays the performance of the “Constant-Vol” strategy on small- and medium-
capitalization assets. As we can see from this figure, the distribution of its P & L profile
is significantly different from a normal distribution (which is the case for large-cap US
stocks) with quite high levels of skewness and kurtosis due to the presence of stochastic
volatility effect. Thus at least some adjustment has to be made to identify and capture
the relevant characteristics for these assets.
5 An Extension: The Incorporation of Limit Orders
Consider a trader, he/she may submit sell limit orders specifying the quantity and the
indicated price per share, which will be executed only when incoming buy market orders
are matching with the limit orders. Otherwise, he/she can post sell market orders for an
immediate execution, but in this case he/she is going to obtain a less favorable execution
price.
Suppose that sell limit orders are submitted at the current best ask, and that the
ask-bid spread ∆ keeps unchanged throughout the trading horizon. Moreover, assume
that other participants’ buy market orders arrive at Poisson rate λM = A exp(−κ∆), a
decreasing function of ∆ as in the literature. Let Mt count the numbers of buy market
orders arriving at the system by time t. The number of shares held by the trader, Xt, can
then be expressed by (N = 1)
Xt = X0 −Mt −
∫ t
0
θudu, X0 = Q. (30)
Remark 1 Actually, controls belonging to Θt need to satisfy one more condition:
θt
∣∣∣
dMt=1
= 0, (31)
i.e., market order can only be used at times when sell limit orders are not executed. Since
for any admissible control process, the integrands in the following two integrals∫ t
0
I{dMu=0}θudu and
∫ t
0
θudu
differ at only finitely many times, and when we integrate with respect to the Lebesgue
measure du, these differences do not matter. Technically speaking, the set of all jumps of
the integrand is a countable set, and hence, it has Lebesgue measure zero. Therefore, no
mandatory requirement is made to satisfy condition (31) in a continuous-time liquidation
setting.
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The advantage of market orders over limit orders is that they are less affected by averse
price impacts. Suppose a company revises its growth estimates upwards. Those investors
who observe piece of this news may react by submitting buy market orders, executed
against sell limit orders in the limit order book that have not yet been withdrawn. All
these executed sell limit orders may incur opportunity costs due to the adverse selection
risk. Market orders, however, will involve unfavorable transaction fees–market impact.
5.1 Adverse Selection
It is possible to incorporate the effect of adverse selection in the trading strategy by
assuming that when other participants’ market orders arrive, they may induce a jump in
the stock price in the direction of the trade.
Assume that the bid-price6 satisfies the stochastic differential equation
dSIt = dSt + η
udMt − ηddMˆt − ηperθtdt, (32)
where {Mˆt}t≥0 is a jump process satisfying{
P(dMˆt = 1|dMt = 0) = λMηuηd dt
P(dMˆt = 1|dMt = 1) = 0,
(33)
and ηu, ηd > 0 represent the jump in bid-price just after a market order event.
Let us give a brief comment on Eqs. (32) and (33). If bid-side liquidity is found for
the order at time t ∈ [0, T ), i.e., dMt = 1, the expected execution price for the order at
time t moves up (by ηu). If no liquidity is found on that side, i.e., dMt = 0, the expected
price move is supposed to be in the opposite direction. By Eq. (33),
P(dMˆt = 1) = P(dMˆt = 1|dMt = 0)× P(dMt = 0) + P(dMˆt = 1|dMt = 1)× P(dMt = 1)
= λ
Mηu
ηd
dt× P(dMt = 0)
= λ
Mηu
ηd
dt+ o(dt),
(34)
and
P(dMˆt = 0) = 1− λ
Mηu
ηd
dt+ o(dt).
Therefore,
Et[∆SIt ] = Et[SIt − SIt−]
= [λMdt+ o(dt)]× ηu − [1− λMdt+ o(dt)]× [λMηu
ηd
dt+ o(dt)]× ηd
= o(dt).
To evaluate the effect of the adverse selection on trader’s trading strategy, we consider
the simplest case: risk-neutral investors. Similar conclusions may also hold for risk-averse
investors.
6Since sell market orders are executed against buy limit orders, SIt is actually the best bid at time t.
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• For a market-order only trader who does not have any limit orders in the market
and simply uses market orders to implement his/her liquidation mandate, we have
ηu = ηd = 0. That is, the trader does not use limit orders to “monitor” other
participants’ trading behavior, and believes that that stock price evolves over time
according to
dSIt = dSt − ηperθtdt.
It is straightforward to verify that the solution to the associated HJB equation is
J(t, q) =
(
1
2
ηper−2K − 1ηtem (T − t)
− η
per
2
)
q2.
The optimal liquidating strategy can then be derived through the relations,
θMt = −
1
2ηtem
[∂qJ + η
perq] ,
XT =
ηtemQ
ηtem + T (2K − ηper) .
(35)
It is straightforward to verify that if K satisfies Condition (14), then θMt ≥ 0, XT ∈
(0, Q), and as K →∞, XT → 0.
It is the simplest liquidating strategy in limit order books for impatient traders (recall
the urgency for liquidation is the primary consideration).
Now let us take limit orders into consideration. In addition to earning ask-bid spreads,
limit orders can also be used to incorporate the effect of adverse selection on the trading
strategy.
• For a risk-neutral trader who seeks to maximize expected terminal wealth with limit
and market orders. Under some smoothness assumptions for a classical solution or
the situation when a unique viscosity solution is considered, the value function J
without any constraints solves ∂tJ + λM [ηu + ∆ + J(t, q − 1)− J(t, q)] +
1
4ηtem
[∂qJ + η
perq]2 = 0
J(T−, q) = −Kq2.
(36)
We conjecture that the solution has the following form:
J(t, q) = f(t) + g(t)q + h(t)q2.
Some simple calculations lead to:
h(t) =
1
2
ηper−2K − 1ηtem (T − t)
− η
per
2
g(t) = −2λM
∫ T
t
e
1
2ηtem
∫ r
t (2h(τ)+η
per)dτ
h(r)dr
f(t) =
∫ T
t
[
λM
(
ηu + ∆ + h(r)− g(r))+ g2(r)
4ηtem
]
dr,
(37)
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and
θM&Lt = −
1
2ηtem
[g(t) + (2h(t) + ηper) q] . (38)
Here θM&Lt denotes the optimal liquidating strategy with limit and market orders.
We remark that,
(1) For any t ∈ [0, T ), h(t) < 0, g(t) > 0. Therefore,
θM&Lt < θ
M
t .
That is, realizing the information carried by other marker participants (as we as-
sumed in our paper, it is monitored by the execution of limit orders), traders will
slow down their liquidating speed so as to get profit from market momentum.
(2) If condition (14) is satisfied,
g(t) = −2λM
∫ T
t
e
1
2ηtem
∫ r
t (2h(τ)+η
per)dτ
h(r)dr
= −2ηtemλM
{∫ T
t
e
1
2ηtem
∫ r
t (2h(τ)+η
per)dτ
d
(
1
2ηtem
∫ r
t
(2h(τ) + ηper)dτ
)
− η
per
2ηtem
∫ T
t
e
1
2ηtem
∫ r
t (2h(τ)+η
per)dτ
dr
}
= −2ηtemλM
{
e
1
2ηtem
∫ T
t (2h(τ)+η
per)dτ − 1− η
per
2ηtem
∫ T
t
e
1
2ηtem
∫ r
t (2h(τ)+η
per)dτ
dr
}
.
Combining the results in Eq. (37), we have
e
1
2ηtem
∫ r
t (2h(τ)+η
per)dτ
=
1
2K−ηper +
1
2ηtem
(T − r)
1
2K−ηper +
1
2ηtem
(T − t) .
If the time horizon T satisfies
T ≤ 2η
tem
2K − ηper
[√
1 +
2(2K − ηper)
ηper
− 1
]
,
then g(t) ≤ 2ηtemλM holds for any time t ∈ [0, T ). That is, the reduced liquidation
speed g(t)
2ηtem
is always smaller than the rate at which limit sell orders are executed.
The overall expected liquidation speed has increased.
(3)  E[X˙t] = −λM − E[θM&Lt ] = −λM +
1
2ηtem
[g(t) + (2h(t) + ηper)E[Xt]]
X0 = Q,
which yields
E[Xt] = Qe
1
2ηtem
∫ t
0 (2h(τ)+η
per)dτ −
∫ t
0
[
λM − 1
2ηtem
g(u)
]
e
1
2ηtem
∫ t
u(2h(τ)+η
per)dτ
du.
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The liquidation target
Q ≥ max
t∈[0,T )
e
− 1
2ηtem
∫ t
0 (2h(τ)+η
per)dτ
[∫ t
0
[
λM − 1
2ηtem
g(u)
]
e
1
2ηtem
∫ t
u(2h(τ)+η
per)dτ
du− g(t)
2h(t) + ηper
]
,
and we have E[θM&Lt ] ≥ 0 and Xt ∈ [0, Q] for any time t ∈ [0, T ). The obtained
optimal strategy in Eq. (38) is actually the one we are looking for.
The estimation procedure for the parameter λM in Eq. (37) basically matches the
intuition that one must count the number of executions at ask/bid and normalized this
quantity by the length of the time horizon. For high-frequency data over [0, T ], we have
a consistent estimator of λM , which is given by
λ̂M =
#{ executions at ask/bid}
T
.
5.2 Numerical Results
Consider the situation in which stocks are traded in a single exchange, i.e., N = 1. As far
as our simulation is concerned, we adopt the hypothetical values of the model parameters
λM = 100, ∆ = 0.3 and η
u = ηd = ηI = 0.02. Other parameters not listed here are
assumed to be the same as those used in Section 3.2. The simulation is obtained through
the following procedure:
Table 3: The procedure
Step 0. Set initial values at time t = 0;
Step 1. Compute the trader’s liquidating rate θt, given the state variables;
Step 2. If a buy market order arrives at time t, then update the quantities by:
Xt+dt = Xt − 1
Ct+dt = Ct + (S
I
t + ∆)
SIt+ = S
I
t + η
I
execute a trade using sell LOs;
otherwise,{
Xt+dt = Xt − θtdt
Ct+dt = Ct + (S
I
t − ηtemθt) · θtdt execute a trade using sell MOs,
and
SIt+ =
{
SIt − ηI − ηperθtdt, with probability λMdt,
SIt − ηperθtdt, with probability 1− λMdt.
Step 3. Update the affected price by a random increment ±σ√dt:
SIt+dt =
{
SIt+ + σ
√
dt, with probability 0.5,
SIt+ − σ
√
dt, with probability 0.5;
Step 4. Let t = t+ dt. If t < T , return to Step 1; otherwise, stop and exit.
Figures 6 illustrates the dynamics of inventory and affected price for one simulation
of a stock path.
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Figure 6: The dynamics of inventory and affected price: (Black) Market orders only;
(Blue) Market & limit.
We observe that investors without making use of limit orders would liquidate on a
linear trajectory θ = q
a+b(T−t) and receive a relatively lower execution price from a certain
point in time during the trading horizon.
We then run 1000 simulations to investigate the effect of adverse selection on the
trading strategy. The performances of strategies aware of this effect and strategies not
aware of this effect are depicted in Figure 7.
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Figure 7: Profit & Loss profile distributions.
The numerical simulations show that the strategy including the use of limit orders
performs better than the market only strategy, it receives a significantly higher expected
Profit & Loss profile (from risk-neutral traders’ point of view), say 294.9 with both MOs
and LOs and −371.3 with MOs only.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we utilize a quantitative model to discuss the optimal liquidating prob-
lem in an illiquid market. Three different aspects of the optimal liquidation problem are
discussed in our paper: (i) optimal liquidating strategy across multiple venues; (ii) op-
timal liquidating strategy with stochastic volatility (a special case, slow mean-reverting
stochastic volatility, was discussed); and (iii) the incorporation of limit orders in optimal
liquidation problem.
We formulate the optimal liquidation problem with both temporary and permanent
market impacts. Under the no arbitrage assumption, we propose a linear model to
determine the equilibrium price in a competitive market with multiple trading venues.
Multi-scale analysis method is used to discuss the case of stochastic volatility, where the
stochastic volatility is driven by a slow-varying factor νt. As an extension of our model,
we include the use of limit orders. These orders are submitted at the current best ask/bid
with buy limit order not being executed. In addition to earn ask-bid spreads, these orders
can be used to incorporate the effect of adverse selection on the trading strategy.
In our model, the quantity of limit sell orders is assumed to be one share per trade.
Whereas, in reality, it can be multiple shares per trade. This will be an interesting
direction for future research.
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Appendix
Appendix A.
Proof: In this appendix, we give the steps for deriving HJB-1. Using Eq. (4), the
objective at any time t becomes
Et
[ ∫ T−
t
σuXudWu − ηper
∫ T−
t
Xu(β
(1)
u θ
(1)
u + · · ·+ β(N)u θ(N)u )du
−
∫ T−
t
[ηtem,(1)(θ(1)u )
2 + · · ·+ ηtem,(N)(θ(N)u )2]du− λ
∫ T−
t
σ2uX
2
udu−XT−Co(XT−)
]
.
Thus, given initial value Xt = q,
J(t, s, σ, q) = max
θ(·)∈Θt
Et,s,σ,qθ(·)
[ ∫ T−
t
σuXudWu − ηper
∫ T−
t
Xu(β
(1)
u θ
(1)
u + · · ·+ β(N)u θ(N)u )du
− ∫ T−
t
(
[ηtem,(1)(θ
(1)
u )2 + · · ·+ ηtem,(N)(θ(N)u )2]− λσ2uX2u
)
du−XT−Co(XT−)
]
= max
θ(·)∈Θt
Et,s,σ,qθ(·)
[∫ t+∆t
t
σuXudWu − ηper
∫ t+∆t
t
Xu(β
(1)
u θ
(1)
u + · · ·+ β(N)u θ(N)u )du
−
∫ t+∆t
t
(
[ηtem,(1)(θ(1)u )
2 + · · ·+ ηtem,(N)(θ(N)u )2]− λσ2uX2u
)
du
+Et+∆t,s+∆s,σ+∆σ,q+∆qθ(·)
[ ∫ T−
t+∆t
σuXudWu − ηper
∫ T−
t+∆t
Xu(β
1
uθ
(1)
u + · · ·+ βNu θ(N)u )du
−
∫ T−
t+∆t
(
[ηtem,(1)(θ(1)u )
2 + · · ·+ ηtem,(N)(θ(N)u )2]− λσ2uX2u
)
du−XT−Co(XT−)
]]
,
where Et,s,σ,qθ(·) [·] is the conditional expectation conditioned on the control process θ(·) and
the initial state (St, σt, Xt) = (s, σ, q).
Notice that for any control process θ(·) ∈ Θt, we have
Et+∆t,s+∆s,σ+∆σ,q+∆qθ(·)
[ ∫ T−
t+∆t
σuXudWu − ηper
∫ T−
t+∆t
Xu(β
(1)
u θ
(1)
u + · · ·+ β(N)u θ(N)u )du
−
∫ T−
t+∆t
(
[ηtem,(1)(θ(1)u )
2 + · · ·+ ηtem,(N)(θ(N)u )2]− λσ2uX2u
)
du−XT−Co(XT−)
]
= U(t+ ∆t, s+ ∆s, σ + ∆σ, q + ∆q,θ(·))
≤ max
θ(·)∈Θt+∆t
U(t+ ∆t, s+ ∆s, σ + ∆σ, q + ∆q,θ(·))
= J(t+ ∆t, s+ ∆s, σ + ∆σ, q + ∆q).
Thus, we have
J(t, s, σ, q) ≤ max
θ(·)∈Θt
Et,s,σ,qθ(·)
[
J(t+ ∆t, s+ ∆s, σ + ∆σ, q + ∆q) +
∫ t+∆t
t
σuXudWu
−ηper
∫ t+∆t
t
Xu(β
(1)
u θ
(1)
u + · · ·+ β(N)u θ(N)u )du
−
∫ t+∆t
t
(
[ηtem,(1)(θ(1)u )
2 + · · ·+ ηtem,(N)(θ(N)u )2]− λσ2uX2u
)
du
]
.
(39)
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Let θ˜
∗
(·) be the optimal control over [t+ ∆t, T ), modifying the optimal control between
t and t + ∆t by an arbitrary control θ(·), i.e. θ′u = θI{u≤t+∆t} + θ˜
∗
uI{u>t+∆t}. Then, we
obtain
J(t, s, σ, q) ≥ Jθ′(·)(t, s, σ, q)
= Et,s,σ,qθ(·)
[
J(t+ ∆t, s+ ∆s, σ + ∆σ, q + ∆q) +
∫ t+∆t
t
σuXudWu
−ηper
∫ t+∆t
t
Xu(β
(1)
u θ
(1)
u + · · ·+ β(N)u θ(N)u )du
−
∫ t+∆t
t
(
[ηtem,(1)(θ(1)u )
2 + · · ·+ ηtem,(N)(θ(N)u )2]− λσ2uX2u
)
du
]
.
Hence, we obtain
J(t, s, σ, q) ≥ max
θ(·)∈Θt
Et,s,σ,qθ(·)
[
J(t+ ∆t, s+ ∆s, σ + ∆σ, q + ∆q) +
∫ t+∆t
t
σuXudWu
−ηper
∫ t+∆t
t
Xu(β
(1)
u θ
(1)
u + · · ·+ β(N)u θ(N)u )du
−
∫ t+∆t
t
(
[ηtem,(1)(θ(1)u )
2 + · · ·+ ηtem,(N)(θ(N)u )2]− λσ2uX2u
)
du
]
.
(40)
Putting both inequalities, Eq.(39) and Eq.(40), together, we arrive at the Dynamic Pro-
gramming Principle (DPP):
J(t, s, σ, q) = max
θ(·)∈Θt
Et,s,σ,qθ(·)
[
J(t+ ∆t, s+ ∆s, σ + ∆σ, q + ∆q) +
∫ t+∆t
t
σuXudWu
−ηper
∫ t+∆t
t
Xu(β
(1)
u θ
(1)
u + · · ·+ β(N)u θ(N)u )du
−
∫ t+∆t
t
(
[ηtem,(1)(θ(1)u )
2 + · · ·+ ηtem,(N)(θ(N)u )2]− λσ2uX2u
)
du
]
.
Let θ∗(·) be the optimal control over [t, T ), then we have
θ∗t,s,σ,q(t
′, s′, σ′, q′) = θ˜
∗
t+∆t,s+∆s,σ+∆σ,q+∆q(t
′, s′, σ′, q′), for any t′ > t+ ∆t.
The dynamic programming equation, HJB equation, is the infinitesimal version of this
principle.
Appendix B.
Proof: In the case of (1) N = 1; or (2) the trading venues have the same market efficiency,
∆N = λσ
2 > 0. Hence,
h(t;σ) =
√
∆N
a
· ςe
−2√a∆N (T−t) − 1
ςe−2
√
a∆N (T−t) + 1
− η
per
2N
.
Under the assumption that K >
b
2a
+
√
|∆N |
a
, −1 < ς < 0. Therefore, h is a decreasing
function in t, and for any n = 1, · · · , N
2h(t;σ) + ηperβ(n) =
√
∆N
a
· ςe
−2√a∆N (T−t) − 1
ςe−2
√
a∆N (T−t) + 1
≤ 0. (41)
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Recall that 
X˙t = −
N∑
n=1
θn,∗t
θn,∗t = −
1
2ηtem
[
2h(t;σ) + ηperβ(n)
]
Xt.
Hence, Xt satisfies the following first-order ODE: X˙t =
(
N∑
n=1
1
2ηtem
[
2h(t;σ) + ηperβ(n)
])
Xt
X0 = Q,
which yields
Xt = Q · exp
(∫ t
0
N∑
n=1
1
2ηtem
[
2h(u;σ) + ηperβ(n)
]
du
)
∈ (0, Q], for t ∈ [0, T ). (42)
Combining the results in Eq. (41) and Eq. (42), we conclude that, for any n = 1, . . . , N ,
θn,∗t = −
1
2ηtem
[
2h(t;σ) + ηperβ(n)
]
Xt ≥ 0,
and∫ T
0
N∑
n=1
θn,∗t dt = X0 −XT = Q
[
1− exp
(∫ t
0
N∑
n=1
1
2ηtem
[
2h(u;σ) + ηperβ(n)
]
du
)]
≤ Q.
Acknowledgements
This research work was supported by Research Grants Council of Hong Kong under Grant
Number 17301214, HKU Strategic Theme on Computation and Information and National
Natural Science Foundation of China Under Grant number 11671158.
References
[1] Almgren, R. and Chriss, N. (1999), Value under liquidation, Risk, 12(12):61–63.
[2] Almgren, R. (2001), Optimal execution of portfolio transactions, Journal of Risk, 3:5–
40.
[3] Almgren, R. (2003), Optimal execution with nonlinear impact functions and trading-
enhanced risk, Applied Mathematical Finance, 10(1):1–18.
[4] Almgren, R. (2012), Optimal Trading with Stochastic Liquidity and Volatility, SIAM
Journal on Financial Mathematics, 3, 163–181.
35
[5] Brugiere, P. (1996), Optimal portfolio and optimal trading in a dynamic continuous
time framework, 6th AFIR Colloquium. Nurenberg, Germany, 12:89.
[6] Bouchaud, J., Farmer, J. and Lillo, F. (2009), How markets slowly digest changes
in supply and demand, in Handbook of Financial Markets: Dynamics and Evolution,
North-Holland, San Diego, CA, 57–160.
[7] Cartea, A´. and Jaimungal, S. (2015), Optimal Execution with limit and market orders,
Quantitative Finance, 15(8): 1279–1291.
[8] Davis, H. and Norman, A. (1990), Portfolio selection with transaction costs, Mathe-
matics of Operations Research, 15(4):676–713.
[9] Fouque, J., Papanicolaou, G. and Sircar, R. (2000), Mean-reverting stochastic volatil-
ity, International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance, 3(01): 101–142.
[10] Fouque, J., Papanicolaou, G., Sircar, R. and Solna, K. (2011), Multiscale stochas-
tic volatility for equity, interest rate, and credit derivatives, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
[11] Tse, S., Forsyth, P., Kennedy, J. and Windcliff, H. (2013), Comparison between the
mean-variance optimal and the mean-quadratic-variation optimal trading strategies,
Applied Mathematical Finance, 20(5): 415–449.
[12] Forsyth, P., Kennedy, J., Tse, S. and Windcliff, H. (2012), Optimal trade execution:
a mean quadratic variation approach, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
36(12): 1971–1991.
[13] Gatheral, J. (2010), No-dynamic-arbitrage and market impact, Quantitative Finance,
10:749–759.
[14] Li, T. and Almgren, R. (2016), Option hedging with smooth market impact, Market
Microstructure and Liquidity, 02, 1650002 (26 pages).
[15] Øksendal, B. (2003), Stochastic Differential Equation, Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
[16] Øksendal, B. and Sulem, A. (2005), Applied Stochastic Control of Jump Diffusions,
Vol. 498, Berlin: Springer.
[17] Pham, H. (2009), Continuous-time Stochastic Control and Optimization with Finan-
cial Applications, Vol. 61, Springer Science & Business Media.
[18] Rudloff, B., Street, A. and Vallada˜o, D. (2014), Time consistency and risk averse
dynamic decision models: Definition, interpretation and practical consequences, Eu-
ropean Journal of Operational Research, 234(3): 743–750.
[19] Soner, H., Shreve, S., and Cvitanic´ (1994), There is no nontrivial hedging portfolio
for option pricing wth transaction costs, Annals of Applied Probability, 5(2):327–355.
36
